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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
MARDEN D. PEARSON, EDWARD A. CROFTS, and
DWAIN J. PEAR'SON, d/b/a
PEARSON and CROFTS, and
ROBERT CORPORON,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No. 8664

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATE ME NT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees generally with the statement
of facts set out in appellant's brief, but reference
is made to the record for additional facts which
which are material to the determination of this
matter. The record will be referred to hereinafter
as "R" and the deposition of Robert Corporon as
"D".
At the time of the sale of the 1955 Cadillac to
1
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Corporon by Pearson and Crofts it was agreed that
as a part of the consideration the latter would transfer a trailer hitch from a 19'5'3 Cadillac Corporon
had turned in to the 1955 Cadillac he had purchased (D. 5). This agreement was reduced to
writing by making it a part of the sales agreement
(Pltf's Ex. 2.).
On the date of the sale there was not sufficient time to complete the transfer of the trailer
hitch and Corporon was instructed to make an
appointment with the garage foreman (D. 5). An
appointment was made for Saturday, 'September
8, 1955 (D. 5). Ferd Sorenson, a mechanic and
welder employed by Pearson and Crofts (R. 32)
was assigned to make the transfer by the shop
foreman (R. 14) and was working on and attaching the trailer hitch to Corporon's 1955 Cadillac
at the time of the fire which caused the damage
complained of (D. 7-8).
Corporon stayed at the garage while the work
was being performed on his car as he had already
made plans for a trip to California and was n1erely
waiting for the completion of the work in order to
leave (D. 7). The fact that Corporon was present
while the work was being done does not alter the
fact that a bailment existed between him and Pearson & Crofts for the purpose of having· work done
on his automobile.
2
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STATEMENT OF POIN'TS
POINT I.
AT THE TIME THE AUTOMOBILE WAS DAMAGED IT WAS IN THE CARE, CUSTODY OR CONTROL
OF THE DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT, PEARSON
AND CROFT'S.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AT THE TIME THE AUTOMOBILE WAS DAMAGED IT WAS IN THE CARE, CUSTODY OR CONTROL
OF THE DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT, PEARSON
AND CROFT'S.

The policy of insurance issued to the appellant
Pearson and Crofts by the respondent insured Pearson and Crofts for property damage liability, but
under Paragraph 4 of the exclusions excluded coverage for liability resulting from "* * * injury to or
destruction of * * *
2. * * * property in the
care, custody or control of the insured * * *''.
Appellants do not dispute the fact that if the
automobile of Corporon was in the care, custody or
control of Pearson and Crofts at the time the damage occurred there is no coverage under the policy
of insurance issued by the respondent. Therefore,
the sole question for determination is whether or
not Corporon's automobile was in the care, custody
or control of Pearson and Crofts at the time their
3
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employee Ferd Sorenson accidentally set fire to it
with an arc welder.
Corporon brought his automobile to Pearson
and Crofts in accordance with an agreement entered into in advance for the purpose of having a
trailer hitch installed on his automobile. Pearson
and Crofts were, among other things, engaged in
the business of an automobile sales agency and repair garage and in connection with the latter maintained and equipped a service garage and repair
shop and employed mechanics, welders and other
personnel for the purpose of performing work on
customers' automobiles.
While the question of what constitutes "care,
custody or control" appears to be one of first impression with our court, the matter has been the
subject of consideration by other courts, and under
strikingly similar circumstances they haYe held the
property to have been in the "care, custody or control'' or "in charge of" the garage and consequently
excluded the policy.
In the case of 1llaryla?z.d Cas1J.alty Company Y.
Holmsga;ard etal, 133 N. E. 2d 910 (Ill. 56). Holmsgaard drove his car to the Gem ,,. .elding and Machine Shop in Rockford, Illinois, and left it to have
a trailer hitch welded to the fran1e. ''""l1ile a Gem
employee was working on the job the car caught
fire from the welding torch and 'vas totally destroy4
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ed. The shop was covered by Maryland Casualty
Company's M & S schedule liability policy with
express coverage under premises operations for
welding work. An exclusion clause stated the policy
did not apply to "injury to or destruction of * * *
property in the care, custody or control of the
insured.''
Holrnsgaard brought suit against the shop and
the employee, alleging that while the car was under
the "sole care, custody and control" of defendants
his car had been destroyed through their negligence.
Later he amended the complaint by striking out the
quoted words and inserted instead "while in the
possession of the defendants as bailees for hire".
Maryland Casualty brought an action for a declaratory judgment as to its rights and duties, maintaining the exclusion clause barred coverage.
The trial court gave judgment against Maryland Casualty and they appealed. The appeal court
reversed the trial court's decision and held that the
property was a bailment, and bailment includes
custody and control. The property was property in
the care, custody and control of the insured and
excluded by the policy.
In the case of Guidici v. Pacific Automobile
Insur~anc.e Comp~any, 179 Pac. 2d 337 (Calif. 1947),
J. A. Palmquist left his automobile with Earl Clifford, a garage owner, to have the carburetor re5
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paired. While Clifford was cleaning the carburetor
after its removal from the car, a fire started on
the work bench where he was working. The fire
spread and Palmer's automobile was destroyed.
Clifford carried a policy of liability insurance
insuring him against liability for property damage
in the operation of his place of business. The insurer denied coverage upon the grounds that the
policy excluded coverage for damage to "property
owned by, rented to, leased to in charge of or transported by the insured''.
The District Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court and held that Earl Clifford
was a "bailee" of the automobile under a bailment
for purposes of performing services upon it and
as sueh the property was in his "charge, possession
and control".
In the. case of John G. Speirs & Company v.
Underwriters at Lloyd's London: 191 Pac. 2d 124
(Calif. 1948), a Dodge truck belonging to Gussie
Speirs was in the possession of plaintiffs on their
business property in Bakersfield for the purpose
of having a trailer hitch installed. There was no
such hitch then on the truck. The trailer hitch was
pre-fabricated by plaintiffs and 'Yas bei11g welded
on the frame of the truck when a fire occurred,
damaging the truck. The policy of insurance provided as follows:
6
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''It is expressly agreed that the agreement of the company to indemnify attaches
only when the liability imposed by law upon
the assured exceeds the amount stated in
item (a) and (b) below and then only for
such excess.
" (a) $5,000 as respects any one claim or
series of claims arising out of any
one occurrence by reason of the
ownership, operation, maintenance
or control of any automobile.
"(b) $100 as respects any claim or series
of claims arising out of any one
occurrence other than described
above."
Plaintiff sought to have coverage apply under
(b). Defendant claimed the loss to be under (a) as
the truck was in the control of the plaintiff.
The court, in holding that coverage (a) applied,
states at Page 125:
''There can be little doubt that the Dodge
truck was under the control of plaintiffs at
the time of the fire and that the claim for
damages against them arose out of an occurrence by reason of that control.''
Appellants apparently contend that Pearson and
Crofts did not have "care, custody or control" of
the automobile by reason of the fact that Corporon
was present while the work was being done. It is
submitted that such fact is completely and wholly
immaterial. He brought his automobile to the garage
7
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for the specific purpose of having a trailer hitch
installed. He was entitled to, and did tell them of
the work he wanted done and the result desired.
Work of the nature and type he sought was the
business of the garage. In order for the garage
to perform the work, Corporon had to entrust the
care of the automobile to them. AB a bailee the
burden was on the garage to see that the installation and welding of the trailer hitch was done in a
safe and workmanlike manner, and in order to do
this the garage had to have the power or authority
to manage, direct and supervise the installation and
work done.
"Bailment" as defined by Black's Law Dictionary Is:
''A delivery of goods or personal property
by one person to another in trust for the execution of a special object upon or in relation
to such goods, beneficial either to the bailor
or bailee or both and upon a contract, express
or implied, to perform the trust and carry out
such object, and thereupon either to re-deliver
the goods to the bailor or otherwise dispose
of same in conformity \Yith the purpose of
the trust."
Appellants in their brief set out definitions
for the words "care, custody and control", citing
such words as being inherently ambiguous and as
such should be construed against the insurer who
wrote them. While respondent does not deny that
8
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such definitions may have been given, a definition,
to be of value, must be applied in the light of a particular fact situation. In the Holmsgaard, Guidici
and Speirs cases (supra), the question of ambiguity
was raised in considering the words "care, custody
or control" and "in charge of". In each of those
cases the court held the wording to be clear and unambiguous and that as such the rule of construction
as cited by the appellants does not apply. The court,
in the Holmsgaard case, in considering the words
"care, custody and control", words identical to those
in the case at bar, said:
''The language of the policy is clear. The
ruling that ambiguous language is to be construed most strongly against the insurer does
not authorize a perversion of language or the
exercise of inventive powers for the purpose
of creating an ambiguity where none exists".
Appellants state in their brief that if the "care,
custody or control" exclusion is applied, there is no
conceivable situation in which an insurer, under a
garage liability coverage, would be exposed to risk.
Such is not the case. The garage owner is protected
against liability imposed upon him as a result of
injury to or destruction of property arising out
of such coverages as are afforded under the policy,
subject to applicable policy conditions and exclusions. Thus, under the policy in question, if the
damage results to the property upon which the in9
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sured performed service, after it leaves his care,
custody or control and the damage results from the
insured's negligence, he is covered under the policy.
For example, in the case at bar, if the mechanic
Ferd Sorenson had failed to properly weld the hitch
to Corporon's car and it had come loose while Corparon was pulling his trailer to California, Pearson
and Crofts would be covered for any liability imposed upon them. There are numerous other examples of where coverage applies, such as the case
where the garage fails to replace the oil in an automobile motor and it is damaged, or where the oil
plug is left out or is not secured properly, or in a
case where the steering mechanism of an automobile is not repaired properly and the owner or driver
loses control, causing injury or damage.
The exclusion of coverage for property in the
care, custody or control of an insured is found in
the garage liability coverage because of the substantial increase in risk. Coverage for loss of or
damage to property in care, custody or control is
available· to a garage owner either by endorsement
on his garage liability coverage or by a separate
policy. An additional premiun1 is charged by the
insurer, and such endorsement or policy generally
carries a deductib.le clause for collision damage and
full coverage for other types of damage. Pearson and
Crofts apparently had not seen fit to secure this
type of coverage.
10
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CON'CLUSION
It is respectfully concluded that the appellant
Pearson and Crofts as bailees of Corporon's automobile had care, custody or control of said automobile regardless of the physical presence of Corparon, and that such care, custody or control clearly
excludes coverage under respondent's policy of insurance under the provisions thereof hereinabove
set forth.
The ruling of the Third District Court from
which this cause arises must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN
ROBERT W. BRANDT

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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